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Williams v. Angelone
No. 98-28, 1999 WL 249026
(4th Cir. Apr. 28, 1999)1
I. Facts
On November 9,1993, Marion DeWayne Williams ("Williams") killed
Helen Bedsole ("Bedsole") by shooting her twice in the head at close range.
In exchange for the murder, Bedsole's husband paid Williams $4,000.2
Williams pleaded guilty to capital murder and the Commonwealth sought
the death penalty based on the future dangerousness predicate. To support
its claim of future dangerousness, the Commonwealth introduced evidence
of prior unadjudicated acts. Tanesha Alston ("Alston"), Williams's former
girlfriend, testified that he physically abused her.' Other testimony pre-
sented by the Commonwealth revealed that Williams had broken into the
home of Alston's grandmother and attempted to kill her by smothering her
with a pillow and cutting her throat with a knife."
In response to the prior unadjudicated acts introduced by the Com-
monwealth, Williams presented mitigation evidence describing his abusive
and tumultuous upbringing. Jean Brooks ("Brooks"), Williams's aunt, and
Kim Johnston ("Johnston"),,the probation officer who prepared Williams's
presentence report, both testified to the details surrounding Williams's
abusive childhood.' At sentencing, the court found the future dangerous-
ness aggravator and sentenced Williams to death. Williams's subsequent
appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia and the United States Supreme
Court were denied.6
1. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions' at 178 F.3d'1288 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. Williams v. Angelone, No. 98-28, 1999 WL 249026, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 28, 1999).
Williams previously sold drugs to Bedsole's husband. Id.
3. Id. Alston testified that Williams had once pulled her out of her car and beat her,
causing her to lose consciousness and require hospitalization. Id.
4. Id. The Commonwealth also presented testimony indicating that Williams
intended to murder other members of Alston's family. Id.
5. Id. Brooks testified that Williams's stepfather abused him and that social services
eventually removed Williams from his mother's home. Johnston testified that Williams
suffered abuse from both his mother and stepfather. Johnston also revealed that Williams had
a history of hospitalization for mental and emotional disturbances. Hospital records
authenticating this history were admitted into evidence. Id.
6. Id. (citing Williams v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 50 (Va.), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
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Williams then filed a petition for state habeas relief in which he claimed
that his trial counsel were ineffective for (1) failing to develop and present
adequate mitigation evidence explaining how he was abused as a child, (2)
failing to explain the importance of expert psychological testimony and to
obtain such testimony, and (3) failing to file an appeal or to follow the
requirements of Anders v. California,7 thereby denying Williams assistance
of appellate counsel. Williams also moved to have a psychological expert
appointed. In opposition to Williams's petition, the Commonwealth
presented an affidavit prepared by David Bouchard ("Bouchard"), one of
Williams's trial attorneys. According to Bouchard's affidavit, Dr. Weare
Zwemer, a clinical psychologist, was obtained to evaluate Williams for the
purpose of developing mitigation evidence. Although Williams refused to
cooperate, Dr. Zwemer concluded that, if asked to testify, he would diag-
nose Williams with antisocial personality disorder and would be unable to
assure the court that Williams would not pose a future danger to society!
The Supreme Court of Virginia denied Williams's habeas petition and his
motion for the appointment of an expert. The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
9
Williams then petitioned the district court to appoint an expert to assist
in the preparation of a federal habeas petition. The motion was initially
granted, but the district court later vacated the order. Before the order was
vacated, Dr. Leigh Hagan evaluated Williams and submitted an affidavit
diagnosing Williams with attachment disorder. Dr. Hagan also stated that
Williams would probably adjust favorably to a prison environment. In his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in district court and request for an
evidentiary hearing, Williams again asserted the claim that his trial counsel
were ineffective for failing to obtain expert testimony for use in mitigation.
In support of his petition, Williams submitted his own affidavit along with
that of Dr. Hagan. In his affidavit, Williams stated that if his attorneys had
explained the purpose of the expert psychological testimony, then he would
have cooperated.1 The district court ultimately dismissed Williams's habeas
998 (1996)).
7. 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (holding that when appointed appellate counsel wants to
withdraw, counsel must first submit a brief to the client and the court outlining all possible
appellate issues, the defendant must have an opportunity to raise additional issues, and the
court must find that all appellate issues would be frivolous if they were brought on appeal).
8. Williams, 1999 WL 249026, at *1-2. Dr. Zwemet's conclusions were based on his
review of Williams's records and his observance of Williams while in conference with his
attorneys. Williams's attorneys did not submit the report into evidence or call Dr. Zwemer
to testify at sentencing. Id.
9. Williams v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 454 (1997) (mem.).
10. Williams, 1999 WL 249026, at *2. Williams stated that he thought the purpose
behind the expert psychological testimony was to show that he was insane. Id.
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petition and request for in evidentiary hearing but granted his application
for a certificate of appealability."1
I. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit made the
following rulings: (1) although the district court erroneously concluded
that Williams's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was defaulted, the
district court did not err in denying Williams's request for an evidentiary
hearing; and (2) because Williams's attorneys did not violate the require-
ments of Anders, Williams was not denied effective assistance of counsel at
the appellate level.12
IIL Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Unadjudicated Acts and Future Dangerousness
Williams's case illustrates the ease with which unadjudicated acts can
translate into a future dangerousness finding. Because there is currently no
standard of proof by which an unadjudicated act must be judged, evidence
of unadjudicated acts is often unreliable and prejudicial.13  Use of
unadjudicated acts during the penalty phase also compromises a defendant's
due process rights by denying him sufficient notice and opportunity to be
heard on those issues. The prejudicial impact of unadjudicated acts can be
minimized if defense counsel knows in advance what acts the Common-
wealth intends to introduce. Thus, one way to minimize the damaging
impacts of unadjudicated acts is to file a motion requesting that the Com-
monwealth provide notice as well as a description of the conduct it intends
to introduce as proof of future dangerousness.4
B. Using Expert Testimony as Mitigation Evidence During Sentencing
Williams's ineffective assistance of counsel claim centered upon the
failure of his trial counsel to obtain and present expert mitigation testimony
at sentencing. Because Williams raised the issue in his state habeas petition,
the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in concluding that the
claim was defaulted." However, the court also concluded that the district
11. Id.
12. Id., at *3-4.
13. See Tommy Barrett, A Modest Proposal: Requiring Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
for UnadjudicatedActs Offered to Prove Future Dangerousness, CAP. DEF. J., Spring 1998, at 58
(proposing that requiring unadjudicated acts to be judged against a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard will fill the void created by the absence of heightened reliability in capital sentencing
in Virginia).
14. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3(2) (Michie 1999).
15. Williams, 1999 WL 249026, at *3.
1999]
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court's refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing was appropriate. The court
determined that, although he raised his claim in state court, Williams failed
to present evidence supporting the claim.16 Thus, for Williams to be enti-
tled to an evidentiary hearing, he needed to show both cause and prejudice,
or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.17 The court concluded that even if
Williams were able to demonstrate cause, he could not establish actual
prejudice."8 While the court found Dr. Hagan's affidavit had value as
mitigating evidence, the court refused to conclude that the sentencing judge
would have reached a different result had he been provided with the affida-
vit at sentencing. 9
In an affidavit supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
Williams stated that his attorneys did not explain the purpose of his first
psychological evaluation.20 Had Williams understood the function that
expert psychological testimony plays during the sentencing phase, it is more
likely that he would have cooperated during the evaluation. A key to
capital defense is the development of a rapport between the client and
attorney. Thus, it is important for capital defense attorneys to explain to
the client the ramifications of each step in the judicial process.
C. Anders Claim
Williams claimed that his attorneys' failure to raise any issues on appeal
beyond those the Supreme Court of Virginia was required to consider
violated Anders.2 The court noted that Anders establishes the procedures
which appointed counsel must follow before withdrawing from a case.' In
such cases, Anders requires counsel to submit a brief discussing potential
appellate issues and requires that the client be permitted to raise any addi-
tional concerns in the brief.23 The court rejected Williams's characterization
of his claim as an Anders issue because his counsel presented both a brief and
an oral argument advocating what they believed was his strongest position.
24
Although the Fourth Circuit ultimately determined that Williams's
counsel provided adequate appellate assistance, the capital defense bar
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992)).
18. Id., at *4. To demonstrate actual prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
19. Williams, 1999 WL 24026, at *4.
20. Id., at *2.
21. Id., at *4. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).





should structure its conduct on a higher standard. Because claims that are
not briefed before a court will not be considered, it is imperative in the
capital context to raise any issues having merit. Focusing solely on the
strongest argument in a case to the exclusion of weaker but still valid claims
is a dangerous practice in capital cases. As a general rule, all potentially
valid claims should be raised in order to preserve them for review. More-
over, to ensure that a claim is preserved for federal review, it must be
framed as a violation of both the United States Constitution and state law.
In Virginia, however, there is a procedural rule that imposes a fifty-page
limit on all opening briefs submitted to the Supreme Court of Virginia."
The fifty-page brief limit is an established rule of the court and may only be
extended by leave to file a longer brief. If the motion to extend the brief is
unsuccessful, then counsel must brief all of the claims it wishes to pursue
within the established page limitations.
Heather L. Necklaus
25. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:26(a).
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